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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DAVID N. HYATT,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NOS. 43139 & 43142
BONNER COUNTY NOS. CR 2009-3186
& CR 2010-3292
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David N. Hyatt appeals from the district court’s orders revoking his probation and
denying his Rule 35 motion requesting leniency and credit for time served. He argues that the
district court abused its discretion by concluding that he violated his probation, revoking his
probation, and denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motions for leniency and credit for time
served.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2009, Mr. Hyatt pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender in Bonner County
Case No. Cr-2009-3186 (the “2009 case”). (2009 R. Vol. I, pp.86–96.) The court sentenced him
to serve four years, with two years fixed, suspended his sentence, and placed him on probation
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for two years. (2009 R. Vol. I, pp.124–28.) In June 2010, Mr. Hyatt admitted to violating his
probation by battering his wife and drinking (2009 R. Vol. I, pp.146,183), and the State filed
another probation violation shortly after (2009 R. Vol. I, p.196). Mr. Hyatt admitted those
allegations, which included that he unlawfully entered a home, violated a civil protection order,
drove under the influence of alcohol,1 and drove without a license, insurance, or an ignition
interlock device. (2009 R. Vol. I, p.196; 2009 R. Vol. II, 269.) At the disposition hearing, the
court revoked Mr. Hyatt’s probation but retained jurisdiction over him. (2009 R. Vol. II,
pp.285–87.)
Meanwhile, in Bonner County Case No. Cr-2010-3292 (the “2010 case”), Mr. Hyatt pled
guilty to driving under the influence. (2010 R. Vol. I, pp.84–94.) The court sentenced Mr. Hyatt
to three years, with one year fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (2010 R. Vol. 1, pp.98–101.)
After a successful rider, the court placed Mr. Hyatt on probation in both cases in
February 2011. (2009 R. Vol. II, pp.294–98; 2010 R. Vol. I, pp.112–16.) In September 2012,
the State alleged that Mr. Hyatt violated his probation. (2009 R. Vol. II, p.320; 2010 R. Vol. I,
pp.134–62.) Mr. Hyatt admitted he provided shelter to a runaway minor and associated with
someone he was not supposed to. (2009 R. Vol. II, p.320; 2009 R. Vol. III, 458; 2010 R. Vol. II,
pp.249–51.) The court gave him credit for the 137 days he had already served, and placed him
back on probation in January 2013. (2009 R. Vol. III, pp.462–63; 2010 R. Vol. II, pp.254–55.)
In October 2014 and January 2015, the State filed two additional probation violations
against Mr. Hyatt. (2009 R. Vol. III, pp.468–69, 515–16; 2010 R. Vol. II, pp.259–70, 304–13.)
The State later withdrew the October 2014 violation and proceeded on the January 2015
violation, which is at issue in this appeal. (2/6/15 Tr., p.28, L.19–p.29, L.5.) The State alleged
1

This is the same conduct that led to Mr. Hyatt’s conviction for driving under the influence in
the 2010 case.
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that Mr. Hyatt committed three acts of domestic battery in September and December 2014, and
that he drank alcohol in December 2014. (2009 R. Vol. III, pp.515–16; 2010 R. Vol. II, pp. 304–
13.)
At the admit/deny hearing, Mr. Hyatt denied the State’s allegations. (2/6/15 Tr., p.5,
L.14.) Mr. Hyatt’s probation officer, Mr. Buck, and Mr. Hyatt’s wife both testified for the State.
Mr. Buck testified that, based on his review of the police reports, Mr. Hyatt violated his
probation by battering his wife and drinking alcohol. (2/6/15 Tr., p.9, L.17–13, L.17.) Ms. Hyatt
testified that Mr. Hyatt “threw” her on September 3, 2014, causing her to separate her shoulder
(2/6/15 Tr., p.14, L.19–p.15, L.24); he threw her into the couch a week later causing her to
dislocate her shoulder (2/6/15 Tr., p.19, L.17–p.20, L.3); and on December 18, he drank all day
long, broke in the windows of their house, beat her up, and possibly caused her to miscarry
(2/6/15 Tr., p.21, L.8–p.23, L.13). She also testified that she had accidentally been giving him a
double dose of his seizure medication, Lamotrigine, and that one of its side effects are violent
outbursts. (2/6/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.19–24, p.16, L.22–p.19, L.9.) Ms. Hyatt believed that the
overdose of Lamotrigine caused Mr. Hyatt’s violence. (2/16/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.19–24.)
At the close of evidence, defense counsel asked the court to keep in mind that Mr. Hyatt
had been overdosing on Lamotrigine, and that the side effects include “swelling, depression,
trouble sleeping, irritable [sic], anger, violence, acting on dangerous impulses.”
Tr., p.29, L.21–p.30, L.4.)
The court found that Mr. Hyatt violated his probation:
Mr. Hyatt, it does appear that you violated the terms of your probation by
committing unlawful acts with three different incidents of domestic battery and at
least one incident of drinking on December 18th. I find more likely than not that
that did occur. There’s some mitigation offered then that you may have been
taking too much medication. But I do find that the State has established that you
have violated your probation.
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(2/6/15

(2/6/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.5–13.)
At the disposition hearing, the State asked that the Court impose Mr. Hyatt’s sentences,
while Mr. Hyatt asked that the court not send him to prison. (4/6/15 Tr., p.7, L.21–p.10, L.9.)
The court concluded that probation was no longer appropriate, and revoked his probation.
(4/6/15 Tr., p.13, L.14–p.15, L.15.) It imposed his underlying sentence of four years, with two
years fixed, in the 2009 case (2009 R. Vol. III, pp.559–60), to run concurrently to his underlying
sentence of three years, with one year fixed, in the 2010 case (2010 R. Vol. II, pp.346–48). The
court said he would get credit for “all time served” and the parties said they would sort out the
correct amount. (4/6/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.15–21.)
The parties filed stipulated motions for credit for time served in both cases. (2009
R. Vol. III, p.564; 2010 R. Vol. II, p.351.) The parties agreed that, as of April 6, 2015, Mr. Hyatt
had already served 451 days in the 2009 case and 442 days in the 2010 case (Id.), and the court
granted the stipulated motions (2009 R. Vol. III, p.565; 2010 R. Vol. II, p.352).
Mr. Hyatt next filed timely Rule 35 motions requesting leniency. (2009 R. Vol. III,
pp.566–69; 2010 R. Vol. II, pp.353–56.) He explained that his wife’s health and financial
problems had worsened since his incarceration, and asked the court to reduce his sentence to six
months in county jail. (Id.) Mr. Hyatt then filed amended Rule 35 motions asking for additional
credit for time served. (2009 R. Vol. III, pp.576–79; 2010 R. Vol. II, pp.364–66.) He explained
he was entitled to 542 days in the 2009 case (2009 R. Vol. III, p.577), and 452 days in the 2010
case (2010 R. Vol. II, p.365). The State opposed the motions, arguing that Mr. Hyatt’s sentences
were appropriate and that it would show, at a hearing, that he was not entitled to any additional
credit for time served. (2009 R. Vol. III, pp.582–85; 2010 R. Vol. II, pp.378–81.)
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The district court denied Mr. Hyatt’s motions without a hearing. (2009 R. Vol. III,
pp.588–93; 2010 R. Vol. II, pp.384–89.) It found that the sentences imposed were appropriate
and did not consider whether Mr. Hyatt was entitled to additional credit for time served because
defense counsel had stipulated to the amount given. (Id.)
Mr. Hyatt filed notices of appeal timely from the orders revoking his probation and
denying his Rule 35 motions. (2009 R. Vol. III, pp.571–72; 2010 R. Vol. II, pp.358–59.)
ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it found Mr. Hyatt violated his probation
without determining whether that violation was willful?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Hyatt’s probation?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hyatt’s Rule 35 motions
requesting leniency?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hyatt’s Rule 35 motions
requesting credit for the time he actually served in these cases?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Found Mr. Hyatt Violated His Probation
Without Determining Whether That Violation Was Willful
According to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f), “[t]he court shall not revoke probation unless

there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the
defendant willfully violated a condition of probation.” (Emphasis added). A violation is not
willful if it is not knowing and intentional or was beyond the probationer’s control. See State v.
Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 222–23 (2014). Because Rule 33(f) uses the language “shall not,” the
restriction it imposes is mandatory. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760 (2002) (quoting
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Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848 (1995)). Thus, if a violation of a condition of probation is not
knowing or intentional, or is not within the defendant’s control, the court cannot revoke
probation. See I.C.R. 33(e). The State has the burden of proving the violation. State v. Rose,
144 Idaho 762, 765 (2007). Further, substantial and competent evidence must support the
district court’s finding of a willful probation violation. Easley, 156 Idaho at 222.
“When a discretionary ruling has been tainted by legal or factual error,” this Court will
“ordinarily vacate the decision and remand the matter for a new, error-free discretionary
determination by the trial court.” State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1995). Remand
is not necessary, however, if “it is apparent from the record that the result would not change or
that a different result would represent an abuse of discretion.” Id. “Therefore, if the district
court erred in finding one probation violation but correctly found one or more other violations,
remand is not necessary if it is clear from the record that the district court would have revoked
probation based solely upon the other violations.” Id.
Here, the district court did not explicitly find that Mr. Hyatt’s violation was willful, and
Mr. Hyatt contends that substantial evidence does not support such a finding. Ms. Hyatt testified
that, as of August 2014, she had accidentally been giving Mr. Hyatt a double dose of his seizure
medication, Lamotrigine. (2/6/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.19–24, p.16, L.22–p.19, L.9, p.18, Ls.4–25.)
Ms. Hyatt also explained that one of Lamotrigine’s side effects are violent outbursts2 (id.), and
she believed that the overdose of Lamotrigine was causing the rages Mr. Hyatt went into when

2

According to the U.S. National Library of Medicine, Lamotrigine’s side effects include serious
mood changes, depression, irritability, restlessness, and unusual thoughts or behaviors. See U.S.
National Library of Medicine, Lamotrigine (by mouth), published Dec. 1, 2015, available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMHT0010856/?report=details#side_effects.
Ms. Hyatt provided information on the medication to both defense counsel and the State, but it
does not appear that information was ever filed with the district court. (See 2/16/15 Tr., p.17,
Ls.6–10, p.30, Ls.2–3.)
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he battered her (2/16/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.19–24). The court did not appear to consider whether that
evidence went to the willfulness of Mr. Hyatt’s actions. Instead, it merely stated that “[t]here’s
some mitigation offered then that you may have been taking too much medication.” (2/6/15
Tr., p.30, Ls.11–12.) Mr. Hyatt therefore argues that the district court abused its discretion by not
determining whether he willfully violated his probation, and that, in light of Ms. Hyatt’s
testimony, substantial evidence does not support such a finding.
Further, this error requires remand. Here, the district court found that Mr. Hyatt violated
his probation both by battering Ms. Hyatt and by drinking alcohol (2/6/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.5–10),
but the battery allegations were undoubtedly more egregious. The State’s argument in support of
revocation centered on Mr. Hyatt’s abuse of Ms. Hyatt. (4/6/15 Tr., p.8, Ls.–10–15 (“In this
case, if you remember right, he had the one PV pending. He got out after having committed the
domestic battery. He got back out of custody and without another couple of days committed the
second domestic battery against the same victim.

So he’s not an individual that can be

trusted.”).) Although the district court’s decision to revoke Mr. Hyatt’s probation mentioned his
drinking problem, it focused on the battery allegations and Mr. Hyatt’s violence generally.
(4/6/15 Tr., p.13, L.14–p.15, L.15.) It is not clear that the district court would have revoked
Mr. Hyatt’s probation solely because he drank alcohol one time; therefore, remand is necessary
for “a new, error-free discretionary determination” by the district court on the alleged probation
violations. Upton, 127 Idaho at 276.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Hyatt’s Probation
Whether a willful violation of a condition of probation justifies revoking a defendant’s
probation “is a question addressed to the judge’s sound discretion.” State v. Adams, 115 Idaho
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1053, 1054 (Ct. App. 1989). However, “a judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily.” Id. at
1055. “[P]robation may be revoked if the judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s
conduct that probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose.” Id. Further, I.C. § 19-2601(4)
gives the district court the discretion to revoke a defendant’s probation, suspend his sentence,
and retain jurisdiction so that he can participate in treatment and programming.
This Court defers to the trial court’s decision unless it was an abuse of discretion.
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055. The Court considers the entire record, including the defendant’s
conduct before and during probation, State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 153–54 (1986), and
must take into consideration the protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution,
State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5–6 (2010).
Mr. Hyatt contends that executing his sentence was not necessary to further the goals of
sentencing. See id. As explained by defense counsel, Mr. Hyatt was taking the wrong dose of
medicine when he committed these violations, which “affected his behavior to a certain extent.”
(4/6/15 Tr., p.8, L.25–p.9, L.12.) Mr. Hyatt told the court that he had “never been that violent in
the past,” and he knew “it was the medication that caused that behavior.” (4/6/15 Tr., p.11,
Ls.9–23.) At the same time, he said “[t]here’s no excuse for the way [he] treated her and [he]
cannot blame it on the medication issue.” (3/24/15 Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),
p.27.) He also acknowledged that he needs counseling for his mental health problems. (PSI
p.25.) As for his drinking, he said “[t]here are AA meetings available to me in Priest River
which I can get to without hindering anybody because I can get there on my bicycle.” (4/6/15
Tr., p.12, Ls.13–15; see also PSI p.27.) He also apologized to his wife for everything he had put
her through, and vowed to spend the rest of his life making it up to her. (4/6/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.5–
13.) Mr. Hyatt explained why the court should continue him on probation:
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I feel I deserve another chance to complete my probation. I did—I did fine for the
first two years, then I had a mishap, and then I did two more years again. That’s
not the sign of somebody whose [sic] hopeless.
I have work waiting for me and everyday [sic] I spend in here is another
day my wife struggles to maintain our home without me.
(4/6/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.16–32.) Finally, Mr. Hyatt is lucky to have the support of his brothers, who
wrote to the court to vow that they would help keep Mr. Hyatt on the right track. (See Aug.3)
Because Mr. Hyatt’s incarceration is not necessary to serve the goals of sentencing, he argues
that the district court abused its discretion by not continuing him on probation.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hyatt’s Rule 35 Motions
Requesting Leniency
An otherwise lawful sentence may be altered under Rule 35 “if the sentence originally
imposed was unduly severe.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Even if the
sentence was not excessive when pronounced, a defendant can prevail on a Rule 35 motion if the
sentence is excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for
reduction. Id. “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same
as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id.
Mr. Hyatt’s combined sentence of four years, with two years fixed, was excessive in light
of the new information he provided in his Rule 35 motion. In his motions, Mr. Hyatt told the
court:
Undo [sic] stress is causing my wife serious health problems which in turn
are causing great financial strain due to doctor/hospital visits and subsequent
medication for her heart. Recently released from Sacred Heart Hospital in
Spokane and placed on bed rest for 7 days, my wife is fighting tooth & nail to
save our home.

3

Mr. Hyatt filed a motion to augment the record concurrently with this brief.
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I feel that my sentence was excessive and therefor [sic] adding to my
wife’s hardship. She has a heart condition which has never been a problem until
now. It is affecting her finances and jeopardizing her ability to pay the bills/rent.
(2009 R. Vol. III, p.564; 2010 R. Vol. II, p.354.) Mr. Hyatt provided the court with the
following additional information:
On 4-14-15 my wife came to visit. During this visit I learned she was
unable to pay the rent and was forced to vacate our home. Unable to afford
movers and storage, almost all of our furniture had to be sacrificed along w/some
personal items & clothing.
She is now living with an elderly relative in CDA where she feels she has
better chances to find full time work.
She is determined to stand by me through this and have a home waiting by
the time I am released, as long as her heart condition allows her to work.
I feel like she is being punished more than me, and I need to be out there
helping her with life’s struggles. Not in here adding to them.
Please find it in your heart to sentence me to 6 months county jail rather
than my full prison term.
I will attend AA and anger management classes. I will accept an
extension of my probation. Please, think of my wife.
(2009 R. Vol. III, p.568; 2010 R. Vol. II, p.355.) In light of that new information, Mr. Hyatt
contends that the district court erred by not reducing his sentence to six months in county jail.
IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hyatt’s Rule 35 Motions
Requesting Credit For The Time He Actually Served In These Cases
Idaho Code § 18-309 governs the award of credit for time served. It provides that, “[i]n
computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the judgment was entered shall
receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment . . . .”
I.C. § 18-309(1) (emphasis added); see also I.C. § 18-309(2) (“In computing the term of
imprisonment when . . . sentence has been suspended and is later imposed, the person against
whom the judgment is . . . imposed shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of
incarceration served as a condition of probation under the original . . . suspended judgment.”).
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As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20–21 (Ct. App.
2014):
The language of I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory and requires that . . . the court give
the appropriate credit for prejudgment incarceration. This means that the
defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated before judgment. The
converse is also true—that the defendant is not entitled to credit under I.C. § 18309 for any time not actually spent incarcerated before judgment. Accordingly, a
district court may only give credit for the correct amount of time actually served
by the defendant prior to imposition of judgment in the case; the district court
does not have discretion to award credit for time served that is either more or less
than that.
(Emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
Mr. Hyatt’s amended Rule 35 motion explained that he was entitled to 542 days of credit
in the 2009 case and 452 days of credit in the 2010 case. (2009 R. Vol. III, p.577; 2010 R. Vol.
II, p.365.) In support of that motion, Mr. Hyatt attached an e-mail from Charles Newsom with
the Bonner County Sherriff’s Office, which listed all of the dates Mr. Hyatt was in jail. 4 (2009
R. Vol. III, p.578; 2010 R. Vol. II, p.366.) The court denied his motion without a hearing and
without considering its merits. Instead, it explained: “defense counsel having stipulated on
April 7, 2015, to the amount of credit for time served in both cases, the Court denies Hyatt’s
request to now increase the amount of credit for time served in each case.” (2009 R. Vol. III,
p.593; 2010 R. Vol. II, p.389.)
The district court erred by rejecting Mr. Hyatt’s motion simply because defense counsel
mistakenly stipulated to the incorrect amount of credit for time served. As explained in Moore,

4

According to that e-mail, Mr. Hyatt was incarcerated in the 2009 case from May 27, 2009
through June 10, 2009; January 1, 2010 through February 27, 2010; June 25, 2010 through
January 18, 2011; September 9, 2012 through January 23, 2013; and December 19, 2014 through
April 9, 2015. (2009 R. Vol. III, p.577.) In the 2010 case, Mr. Hyatt was in jail from June 25,
2010 through January 18, 2011; September 9, 2012 through January 23, 2013; and December 19,
2014 through April 9, 2015. (2010 R. Vol. II, p.365.) Appellate counsel’s calculations using
these dates do not match those calculations made by defense counsel.
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“a district court may only give credit for the correct amount of time actually served by the
defendant prior to imposition of judgment in the case; the district court does not have discretion
to award credit for time served that is either more or less than that.” Moore, 156 Idaho at 21.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion for
credit for time served and remand this issue to the district court to determine how much time
Mr. Hyatt actually served.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hyatt respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order revoking his probation
and remand to the district court with instructions that place him back on probation. Should the
Court find that the district court properly revoked his probation, Mr. Hyatt asks that this Court
vacate the denial of his motion for leniency and reduce his sentence to six months in county jail.
Finally, he requests that the Court vacate the denial of his motion for credit for time served and
remand for a hearing to determine how much time he actually served.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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